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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
Appeal No. 8710. 
W. E. BUECHE, 
ReBpondent, 
V8. 
CHARLES E. CONNER COMPANY, WIL-
UAM J. CONNER, and CHARLES E. 
CONNER, 
Appellants. 
Appeal from 
District Court, 
Grand County, Utah. 
Honorable 
L. Leland Larson, 
Presiding. 
APPEL.LANT'S' REPLY BRIEF. 
Forewo,rd. 
The defendants-appellants find it necessary to reply to 
the plaintiff's-Respondent's brief because of many inac-
curacies therein, because of summary generalizations 
therein which are misleading because of their generality, 
and because plaintiff discloses a fundamental agreement 
with defendants quite contrary to the Court's Findings 
and Judgment. 
The Memorandum Agreement quoted in plaintiff's brief 
contains several typographical errors of omissions, repe-
titions and misplaced lines of type. This is represented 
as being ''Exhibit 1' '. However ''Exhibit 1'' is a list of 
disbursements (Tr. 38). The Agreement is made a part 
of the pleadings. 
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2 
That Defendants Were Entitled to Judgment at the Close 
of Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case Is Not Disputed. 
As stated in Defendants'-Appellants' main brief, pages 
18-22, plaintiff at the time he rested his prima facie case 
had completely failed to sustain the allegations of his com-
plaint. Motion for Judgment was made by defendants, 
denied by the Court, renewed at the close of all the evi-
dence and again denied. Plaintiff rested his prima facie 
case at Transcript p. 160. 
It is interesting therefore to note that in the plaintiff's 
brief substantially all. references to the transcript, or to 
·Exhibits said to support plaintiff's case, first occur after 
plaintiff had rested (Tr. p. 160). 
We have searched plaintiff's brief carefully. It makes 
103 references to transcript pages. Of these references 
by plaintiff, only 26 of the transcript pages referred to 
relate to what occurred before plaintiff rested his case. 
Not any of these pages tend to support the plaintiff's 
burden. They do support the-- defense. 
Plaintiff cited Tr. 33 as showing the defendants' ex-
penses of a trip to Salt Lake City ( "~hich fact is true), 
hut no reference to such a trip appears on that page. 
He cites Tr. 59 as sho,ving that ·\rilliam J. Conner worked 
on the Lile and N e'v Castle claims ''in the late fall and 
winter of 1955, and the early part of 1956' '. Yet that page 
shows that the witness there questioned "-ras Charles E. 
Conner, who expressly testified, "I rlon 't believe I could 
answer that. I wasn't herP when the work began." The 
pag-e reference in no way supports plaintiff's state1nent. 
Pages 65-81 are cited by plaintiff as sho,ving various 
i terns of expenses paid by defendants. Such items of 
course support the defendan.ts' contentions. 
Page 88 is cited as showing that Charles E. Conner 
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''upon one occasion helped move a few trees out of the 
roadway." That fact is true. If it is intended to repre-
sent that this was all that Charles E .. Conner did, then 
it is not true. Apparently such is the intended representa-
tion of plaintiff's brief (p. 16), although it ignores the 
undisputed testimony adduced by the plaintiff (Tr. 92, 93) 
that Charles E. Conner was very busily engaged, and at 
the instigation of plaintiff himself, throughout 1955 and 
: 1956 in endeavoring to work out prospective n1ergers, and 
incorporation, supervising the work in the mountains, at-
~ tending to paper "\vork and endeavoring, with }(Jr. Bueche 
· the pla.in,tijf, to raise funds to carry on the work. His six 
:' trips to ~ioab during this time were certainly not "for a 
grand vacation" as plaintiff's brief (p. 22) puts it, (but 
~ again without the support of anything except counsel's 
~·imagination) but were necessary business trips which plain-
~. tiff himself urged ( Tr. 149, 151 and Pl. Ex. 9 and 10). 
!;, As ~Ir. Fowler, plaintiff's witness, testified, trips were 
~,made by Mr. Conner from Chicago to Miners Basin and 
1 Moab, and 11r. Bueche himself came on one occasion, and 
1\tir. Fowler traveled to Chicago and met with Mr. Conner 
m~ and Mr. Bueche ''for the purpose of trying to complete 
i the arrangement of merging these properties" (Tr. 149). 
~1; l\fr. Fowler was plaintiff's witness. He 'vas not called by 
!rrdefendants. We do not disagree that Mr. Charles E. 
,~Conner helped remove some trees from the road in Bache-
~ lor's Basin. (It was "trees" at Transcript 88, and was "a 
~~.few trees'' at plaintiff's Brief p. 9. However, as counsel 
r1[became more enthused and careless, it becomes "a tree" 
~at his brief, p. 16}. The simple fact is that Mr. Charles 
~~eE· Conner did a great deal of work, and in the best of faith 
~as the Court found, to bring about success of the project. 
I['· 
)~ As counsel must know, unless he considers his profession 
:tn avocation, it is not only the axman who ''works''. 
~~~ Plaintiff next refers to Tr. 98 to show that $608.00 was 
)aid by defendants for work of a bulldozer. We agree. 
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Plaintiff refers to Tr. 100· as showing that "approxi-
mately 3500 feet of roadway was bulldozed upon the moun-
tainside which took 76 hours". Plaintiff's brief is again 
carelessly incorrect. The witness at that point, Mr. Stocks, 
testified that he was at the location "about two weeks" 
and that the road which was built was "about around two 
miles'' ( Tr. 99). Two miles is 10,560 feet, slightly more 
than three times as great as plaintiff's careless generaliza-
tion. Mr. Stocks testified (Tr. 100) that he worked 76 hours 
on the road (which is very nearly two 40-hour weeks) but 
that Mr. William Conner was also working with him, and, 
asked whether there were "any other workmen there", 
he also named Mr. Fowler (Tr. 100). 
When plaintiff's brief says (citing but not quoting the 
record) that ''approximately 3500 feet of roadway was 
bulldozed upon the mountainside which took 76 hours",-
and it turns out that the actual figures were three times 
that a1nount of footage and about three times as many 
"\vork hours, we believe that brief ought not to be accepted 
in its recitation of fact. 
Plaintiff's brief next refers to Tr. 123 and 124 in support 
of the statement that 1\fr. William Conner and }fr. Fuller 
in 195·6 at Bachelor Basin ''did shovel dirt for a few hours 
to clear out a portal." This statement, however, as it 
appears in the transcript is : 
''-we cleaned out the tunnel so it would be possible 
for ~{r. Mateer to g·o in in case he came back." 
Again, the enthusias1n of plaintiff is unrestrained by the 
record. 
Plaintiff's brief next refers to Tr. 137, 138 and 139 as 
showing- that ~{r. Willian1 Conner n1oved to ~liners Basin 
on June 5, 1955 "\vith the trailer in 'vhich he lived nnd with 
that we do not disagree. He had, however, been there on 
a number of trips earlier in 1955 as plaintiff concedes. 
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Plaintiff says -that in the ·spring of 1955 ''the old mine 
portal and tunnel were in a dangerous condition", with 
which we also agree. He goes on to say,. ho\vever, that-
'' as of the latter part of 1956, said tunnel was still 
in dangerous condition in that posts and caps had 
rotted to the point of being nothing but pulp wood 
( Tr. 139)." 
This latter statement is unsupported by the record cita-
tion. The witness at this point, Mr. Fowler, could not 
testify as to the condition of the tuinnel. He stated that 
he believed it was dang~rous and ''I wouldn't go in''. 
Obviously, therefore, Mr. Fowler· could not testify as to 
the condition of the tunnel for by his own admission he 
never looked at it in 1956. Plaintiff's brief, however, 
seems perfectly willing to overlook. this fact and to tell 
the Court as a fact something which the witness could 
not say. 
The Plaintiff refers to Tr. 144 as showing that :B,owler 
was paid $150.00. However, plaintiff fails to state that 
this very page shows that Mr. Fowler was paid by defend-
ants "for 'vork done in connection with their claims" the 
sum of $150.00 cash and ''a round trip ticket''-" to Chi-
cago" ( Tr. 144). Surely plaintiff does not want to repre-
sent only half-truths to the Court. 
The final portion of the transcript before plaintiff rested 
his case is Tr. 148-152. This plaintiff refers to as show-
ing that ''All of the meetings'' etc. referred to in our brief 
occurred "in the summer of 1955, not early in 1956, as 
· defendants would like one to believe.'' 
But Tr. 146, 147 without doubt discusses a rl'leeting be-
: tween Fowler and Bueche in October, 1956. It is quite 
: true that discussions of merger w·ith Fow·le-r occurred jn 
: 1955, when Mr. Charles Conner was present. What Mr. 
t Bueche and Mr. Fowler discussed in October, 1956, we do 
~:not know. However, the defendants ''would like one to 
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6 
believe·'' only the trut"h in. this case. The truth is that the 
defendants actively worked on the project here involved 
not only up to October 24, 1956, when this action was filed, 
but long thereafter. Work did not cease in November, 
1955, unless one conceives of ''work'' only as chopping 
ice on top of the LaSal Mountains. 
The fact is that active work in connection with the 
project and in which Mr. Bueche participated continued 
through a large part of 1956 . 
.As Mr. Bueche himself testified (Tr. 357), there was 
a meeting in January, 1956 between ~Ir. Bueche, ~lr. Conner 
and Mr. Horton, the subject of which was ''raising addi-
tional capital". 
Mr. Bueche further testified as to a meeting in May, 
1956, not relative to any account, concerning the work to 
be done and attempts to raise money (Tr. 362). At the 
end of that conference, Mr. Bueche, according to his own 
testimony, said: 
''I am not going to talk to you again if you don't get 
something done so the geologists get up in the tunnel." 
(Tr. 365). 
Mr. Bueche further testified that he was subsequently 
advised by a letter in 1956 (Tr. 364.) 
''that the tunnel was cleared and I could send up 
geologists on my O\vn again if I wished.'' 
This testin1ony by 1\!r. Bueche fully supports the testi-
Inony by Mr. William Conner that he and ~Ir. Fuller in 
1956 
"cleaned out the tunnel so it would be possible for 
Mr. l\{ateer to g·o in in case he came back" (Tr. 123, 
124). 
We respectfully submit that there is no evidence in the 
record which could support a judgment for the plaintiff 
when he rested his case (Tr. 160). Plaintiff's brief fully 
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sustains this contention and the only portions of the tran-
script which he refers to, before Tr. 160, either support 
the defendants' contentions and disprove the allegations 
of the complaint or they are carelessly and erroneously 
represented for plaintiff's purposes. 
The defendants' Motion to dismiss the complaint when 
plaintiff rested should have been granted. Failure to 
o-rant the Motion is reversible error. ;--, 
Plaintiff's Point IV That a Party May Treat the Other's 
Breach of an Agreement as an Offer to Rescind Is Neither 
Sound in Law Nor Pertinent in Fact as Stated. by Plain-
tiff. 
Under his Point IV, plaintiff contends that where one 
party to an agreement has breached the agreement or de-
faulted, the other party may treat such conduct as an 
offer to rescind ''and acquiesce in the desire so manifested 
to abandon the contract''. 
The portion enclosed in quotation marks in the preced-
ing paragraph is plaintiff's words. We do not understand 
them. 
There was never at any time a breach or default by the 
Conners, and if there was, it was waived by plaintiff. 
Certainly if one party is in default or has committed a 
breach such that the other party may treat it as an offer 
to rescind (if that be sound law, which we doubt), the 
latter party surely must promptly and clearly accept that 
offer to rescind, communicating the acceptance to the part)r 
said to be offering to rescind. Any other course would be 
unjust and contrary to the most basic law. 
The trial judge apparently thought that the defendants 
were in default in November, 1955 simply because 1\tf.r. 
William Conner had come down from Miners Basin to 
Moab and away from those mining claims at that time. 
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8 
But no one could live and work at the, top of the LaSal 
mountains in the winter and not even plaintiff regarded 
that as a breach. Actually, Mr. Conner worked in the low 
levels all winter. 
Both the Court and plaintiff's counsel apparently regard 
the fact that jeeps, trailers, tools, etc. had to be purchased 
and were purchased for the project was in some way a 
misuse of the Bueche money. The Court awarded ''rental 
value'' for such items up to November, 1955, although it 
is undisputed that they were used for the project right 
up to the date of trial. 
Yet, the plaintiff Mr. Bueche regarded these items as 
property of the project and not wrongfully purchased out 
of project funds. 
In June, 1955, if he did not know so before as other proofs 
seem clearly to establish, Mr. Bueche knew that the ''trailer, 
Jeep and other vehicles and equipment were up in the 
mountains" in use on the project (Tr. 351). That he knew 
they were purchased from project funds in which he had 
an interest was evidenced by the fact that he himself in-
sisted that such equipment be brought down from the 
mountains to l\{oab "during the "rinter" (Tr. 352). 
It seems ridiculous to contend that purchase of such 
equipment was not properly made out of project funds, 
and then to have Mr. Bueche giving insistent instructions 
as to their care. If they were not project property, what 
business did Bueche have in saying where it should be 
kept~ 
Furthermore, Mr. Bueche testified that he knew "be-
tween J nne, 1955 and August, 1955 that the trailer was 
purchased with my n1oney" and that he "accepted that" 
(Tr. 352). 
That such equipment was, to be purchased and ,vas neces-
sary 'vas known when the ag·reement was made. It ·was 
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the very reason why $10,000.00 was needed at that time 
and why the parties contemplated the need for additional 
money in the near future. 
There can be no doubt that Bueche knew that such equip-
ment had to be purchased and that in any event he '' ac-
cepted" that situation in June, 1955. 
There is no possible ground therefore for the Court not 
to regard the expenditures for those items as perfectly 
proper, and as property of the venture. There is no basis 
whatsoever for allo,ving to defendants merely the ''rental 
value'' thereof. 
Nearly $6,000.00 therefore was invested in such neces-
sary tools and equipment for the project right at its start. 
This was fully known to Bueche. In November, 1955, 
there remained some $750.00 in an Oak Park, Illinois bank 
and $2,500.00 in the Moab bank. The tools and equipment 
were still in existence of course at that time. Actually, the 
expenditures for food, gas, etc. had been very low. How 
then can anyone reasonably say that the project n1oney 
'vas exhausted and therefore the project abandoned in 
November, 1955~ Such an argument does not make sense. 
The important thing, however, regardless of the argu-
ment, is. that Mr. Bueche did not regard the contract as 
breached or terminated as late as May, 1956 (Tr. 362) nor 
even at the time of trial ( Tr. 366) . 
We submit that the Court was clearly wrong in stating 
that after November, 1955 the parties "had no business 
relations of any kind--except concerning an accounting-" 
(Tr. 369). 
That the Court was in error on this point of fact appears 
without possible doubt from the transcript. The plaintiff, 
Mr. Bueche, was discussing a meeting in May, 1956, with 
l\Ir. Charles Conner. The following occurred: 
''The Court: What the court is trying to find out 
* • * is if you had any business transactions after 
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November 1955 with· these gentlemen, except to try to 
find out about this account T · 
The Witness: I was. • • • I was talking with Mr. 
Conner up to May of 19·56. • * • 
The Court: When you talked with him in May, was 
that about your account Y 
A. No." (Tr. 362, 363.) 
The witness then explained the nature of the meeting 
and discussions of what was to be done, and his demand 
that they ' 'get something done so the geologists get up in 
the tunnel" (Tr. 363). 
The plaintiff, pressed by the Court, twice expressly de-
nied that all was over in November, 1955 except for an 
accounting. This error by the Court is expressly con-
trary to the evidence and cannot be sustained. 
There was no termination or breach of the contract in 
November, 1955 amounting to an offer to rescind and if 
there was, Bueche did not accept it. 
What then is the next breach or default by defendants! 
The failure to report an account f The trial judge errone-
ously thought there had been a failure from November 
1955 to March 1956 to render an account. If that was the 
basis for a charge of default, 'vhen did it occurt Cer-
tainly not in November, 1955. The full records were 
shown to plaintiff in January, 1956 and again in March, 
1956 and again in June, 1956. Never at any time did plain-
tiff give any notice that he regarded a failure to give an 
account an offer to rescind which he accepted. Nor did 
plaintiff ever give notice that there was a breach by failure 
to give an account until this artion 'vas filed many months 
after a full account had been n1ade. 
But Mr. Buechr did not regard the contract as breached 
or abandoned and he did not act in any "~ay to accept "an 
offer to rescind". Quite the contrary. 
Mr. Bueche was firmly of the belief that the tunnel on 
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the claims recorded in 1954 was rich in uranium. The 
Conners did not believe this. to be true, much as they would 
have liked it to be true. Mr. Bueche did not have the right 
to direct where prospecting should be done. Nevertheless, 
by his own words, he told the Conners in May, 1956 (Tr. 
365): 
''I am not going to talk to you again if you don't get 
something· done so the geologists get up in the tunnel.'' 
So the Conners cleaned out the tunnel. 
Did those 'vords by Bueche in May, 1956 indicate an 
acceptance of an offer to rescind~ Did those words by 
Bueche indicate that he stood upon a default terminating 
the contract in November, 1955~ 
Most certainly those words by Bueche indicated that in 
May, 1956 he still considered the contract in full force and 
effect and that unless the Conners cleaned out the tunnel 
he was going to be angry. 
If there ever had been ground to terminate the agree-
ment in November, 1955 or in the spring of 1956, Mr. 
Bueche not only did not exercise it but, by his words and 
conduct, waived it. 
What act occurred after May, 19·56 that was a bre~ch of 
the contract by defendants' None whatsoever I 
Plaintiff's counsel contends that there having been a 
breach by defendants (undefined) that such amounted to 
an offer by defendants to rescind. If that theory were 
sound, it would of course have to be followed by an accept-
ance of the so-called offer. But an acceptance of such an 
offer would have to be promptly made and communicated 
to the offeror. When and what was the acceptance? 
In 1956, further prospecting and work on the claims, 
even on the tunnel, was performed by the Conners. Work 
on the tunnel was done in furtherance of Mr. Bueche's 
express wishes and demands. As Mr. Bueche further said: 
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12 
"I wanted to get that geologist in that tunnel further, 
and really try to find out if there was something 
there." (Tr. 364.) 
Mr. William Conner, as was confirmed by two witnesses, 
was up on the claims prospecting and working on the road 
and on the tunnel with extra labor many times in 1956. He 
prospected many other places within the area specified in 
the contract in 1956. The Court allowed nothing for such 
work whatsoever. 
Near the close of the trial, Mr. Bueche made it perfectly 
clear that he had not accepted any offer to rescind ever 
made by defendants or brought about by operation of law 
(even assuming the possibility thereof in this case, which 
is clearly erroneous.). He was asked as to the contract: 
'' Q. Well you neither repudiate it or say that it is 
over or agree that the contract is terminated or any-
thing of that nature, do you f 
A. I never said anything like that. '' ( Tr. 365.) 
'' Q. As far as you are concerned, until you get 
that $10,000 back you still participate in the contract 
and are entitled to any benefits that could come out 
of it. 
A. I assume so.'' ( Tr. 366.) 
Mr. Bueche never accepted any offer to rescind of any 
kind,-not even at the close of the trial. 
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13 
Conclusion. 
Plaintiff's brief is replete with errors of fact. Its argu-
ment is unsound in law. It failed utterly to prove the 
allegations of the complaint. The complaint should be 
dismissed and an order should be entered reversing the 
judgment and directing entry of an order dismissing the 
complaint with costs to defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RoBERT· H. RuGGERI, 
First Security Bank Bldg., 
Moab, Utah, 
WARREN C. HoRTON, 
HoRToN, D:Avrs & McCALEB, 
208 South LaSalle Street, 
Chicago, Illinois, 
Attorneys and Counsel for 
Appellants. 
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